Seeker beware: The interpersonal costs of ignoring advice☆

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ABSTRACT

Prior advice research has focused on why people rely on (or ignore) advice and its impact on judgment accuracy. We expand the consideration of advice-seeking outcomes by investigating the *interpersonal* consequences of advice seekers' decisions. Across nine studies, we show that advisors interpersonally penalize seekers who disregard their advice, and that these reactions are especially strong among expert advisors. This penalty also drives advisor reactions to a widely-recommended advice-seeking strategy: soliciting multiple advisors to leverage the wisdom of crowds. Advisors denigrate and distance themselves from seekers who they learn consulted others, an effect mediated by perceptions that their own advice will be disregarded. Underlying these effects is an asymmetry between advisors' and seekers' beliefs about the purpose of the advice exchange: whereas advisors believe giving advice is more about narrowing the option set by providing direction, seekers believe soliciting advice is more about widening the option set by gathering information.

1. Introduction

From managing employees or solving complex problems to making purchases or trying to stay healthy, people often rely on advice from others to help them make good decisions. Prior advice research has primarily focused on what has been assumed to be advice seekers' singular objective: optimizing the accuracy of their choices (Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006). However, advice seekers care about more than simply making a correct decision. For example, they are also concerned with the impressions they make on their advisors (Brooks, Gino, & Schweitzer, 2015; Liljenquist, 2010), and the relationships they establish or maintain with them (Goldsmith & Fitch, 1997; Sah, Loewenstein, & Cain, 2013; Schwartz, Luce, & Ariely, 2011).

In this paper, we expand prior conceptualizations of the advice process by investigating the *interpersonal* consequences of the decisions that advice seekers make as they ask for and decide whether to follow the advice they receive. First, we consider the interpersonal consequences of seeking out – then disregarding – the advice one receives. Disregarding advice is a common behavior. In a pilot survey of 119 full-time employees across an array of industries who had sought advice in the past month, 53% reported disregarding or ignoring the advice they had received (see Appendix A for full survey information). We predict that (1) advisors interpersonally penalize those who do not follow their

advice, and that (2) these consequences are especially harsh when seekers consult expert advisors.

Second, we link advisor reactions when their advice is ignored to the interpersonal consequences stemming from a widely recommended advice-seeking strategy: consulting multiple advisors to leverage the wisdom of crowds (Simmons, Nelson, Galak, & Frederick, 2011; Surowiecki, 2004). Our pilot survey revealed that 59% of full-time employees had pursued this strategy in the prior month. Although consulting multiple advisors helps seekers make more-accurate judgments (Johnson, Budescu, & Wallsten, 2001; Soll, 1999), we predict that advisors interpersonally penalize those who choose to seek from other advisors because doing so reduces each advisor's perception that his or her advice will be followed.

Third, we consider why advice seekers may fail to identify and account for the negative relational impact of these choices. We propose that whereas advice seekers are focused on gathering information to broaden the set of alternatives they are considering, advisors focus on providing guidance to help narrow the advice seeker's options. In terms of probability, narrowing an option set increases the likelihood that an advisor's advice would be followed, while broadening the option set decreases the likelihood that the advisor's advice would be followed. This asymmetry in implicit motives is likely to lead advice seekers to make decisions that expose them to unanticipated, adverse relational

consequences (offending the advisor when they gather and then ignore his or her advice).

Our work makes several theoretical contributions. First, we broaden the advice literature by focusing on interpersonal effects rather than decision accuracy, which has been the primary focus of prior advice research (Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006; Hollenbeck et al., 1995). While making accurate decisions is important, other outcomes matter as well—such as the advisor's opinion of the advice seeker, and the future relationship between the advisor and advice seeker (Brooks et al., 2015; Goldsmith & Fitch, 1997; Liljenquist, 2010; Rader, Larrick, & Soll, 2017). Our work sheds light on the complex relationships between different advice seeking outcomes. For example, we highlight how the pursuit of one outcome (decision accuracy) may inversely relate to the pursuit of another (advisors' esteem and relational interest). In doing so, we suggest that prior recommendations for advice seekers to solicit expert advisors and/or multiple advisors should be reconsidered with interpersonal consequences in mind.

Second, in contrast to most extant advice research (Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006), we investigate both the advisor and advice seeker's perspectives. This dual-perspective approach enables us to highlight a meaningful asymmetry between the two perspectives: seekers view the purpose of an advice exchange as information gathering, whereas advisors view the purpose as more to provide guidance. In particular, our work provides rare insight into the advisor's perspective. As the majority of advice research has focused on seekers' decisions to ask for and follow advice (Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006), this window into the advisor's point of view can provide helpful insight for advisors and seekers alike.

2. Advice and decision accuracy

Prior research on advice has mainly focused on how people use advice to improve the accuracy of their decisions and has found that people tend to egocentrically discount advice (for a review of this work, see Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006). Even when the advice they receive is good, people excessively rely on their own intuition at the expense of making more accurate judgments (Harvey & Fischer, 1997; Yaniv & Kleinberger, 2000; Yaniv, 2004).

Related work has explored when people may be more likely to follow the advice they receive. This research reveals that the characteristics of the advice, the situation in which it is given, and the advisor all affect whether seekers will rely on the advice they receive. For example, advice recipients are more likely to follow advice when it has been purchased (Gino, 2008; Patt, Bowles, & Cash, 2006), or when it includes new information (Van Swol & Ludutsky, 2007). Recipients are also more likely to rely on advice when they are anxious or grateful (Gino, 2008; Gino, Brooks, & Schweitzer, 2012), when they perceive the recommendation to benefit the advisor (Sah et al., 2013), when the advice is easily accessible (Hofmann, Lei, & Grant, 2009), when the task is complex (Schrah, Dalal, & Sniezek, 2006), and when they feel less powerful (See, Morrison, Rothman, & Soll, 2011; Tost, Gino, & Larrick, 2012). In addition, people follow advice more often when it comes from advisors with expertise, experience, and confidence (Phillips, 1999; Price & Stone, 2004; Yaniv & Kleinberger, 2000), and when they feel close to the advisor (Feng & MacGeorge, 2006).

Beyond documenting what seekers tend to do (descriptively), additional research has considered what seekers *should* do (prescriptively) to make better decisions. For example, seekers make more accurate decisions when they rely on advice from experts (Shanteau, 1992; Yaniv & Kleinberger, 2000). Perhaps the most well-studied advice-seeking recommendation is to seek advice from multiple people (Yaniv, 2004). Research on the *wisdom of crowds* finds that when seekers obtain advice from multiple advisors, their decision accuracy is improved (Johnson et al., 2001; Simmons et al., 2011; Soll, 1999; Surowiecki, 2004). When seekers approach multiple advisors for advice, the suggestions they receive are likely to differ. Aggregating across multiple recommendations reduces the random error associated with each advisor's

recommendation, resulting in a more accurate composite recommendation (Yaniv, 2004). Moreover, soliciting advice from even a handful of advisors reaps the benefits of error reduction (Budescu & Rantilla, 2000; Yaniv, 2004; Yaniv & Kleinberger, 2000).

Prior research on advice-seeking to promote decision accuracy has made valuable contributions to the field of decision making. However, little work has considered how advice seeker decisions may affect important outcomes beyond judgment accuracy, such as the *interpersonal* dynamics between an advice seeker and his or her advisor(s). Given the significant role of interpersonal considerations in determining one's future success (Casciaro & Lobo, 2008; Kilduff & Day, 1994), we believe interpersonal consequences deserve more attention in the study of advice.

3. Advice seeker decisions are interpersonal

Advice-seeking is inherently interpersonal. In the course of obtaining advice, advice seekers make three primary decisions: (1) whether to seek information about a given topic, (2) from whom to seek it, and (3) whether to rely on the advice they receive. Although the first decision is relatively devoid of relational concerns, interpersonal considerations are critical to the second, and we will argue, also consequential to the third.

People most frequently seek advice from those with whom they have an expectation of subsequent interaction. From employees to managers, to CEOs, people most commonly seek advice from similar others with whom they have a strong tie (Gibbons, 2004; Klein, Lim, Saltz, & Mayer, 2004; McDonald & Westphal, 2003). Similarly, relationship closeness is the strongest predictor of advice receptiveness, even surpassing advisor expertise (Feng & MacGeorge, 2006).

Not only do people seek advice from people they know and will continue to know in the future, but they also tend to choose advisors whose opinions of them matter. People are more likely to seek advice from others within their social network (McDonald & Westphal, 2003), in which reputations can carry significant weight (Blau, 1968; Brass, Butterfield, & Skaggs, 1998; Shane & Cable, 2002; Ferris et al., 2003; Uzzi, 1996). Furthermore, people tend to seek advice from older, higher-status individuals (Agneessens & Wittek, 2012; Feng & MacGeorge, 2006; Nadler, Ellis, & Bar, 2003), whose opinions of them are likely to carry more weight in their networks and communities than their lower-status contacts.

Interpersonal considerations are important as others' impressions affect professional and personal success. For example, how we respond to others (e.g., whether we help them or not) depends on our impressions of them (Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2008; Levine & Schweitzer, 2015). Others' opinions impact nearly every aspect of one's career, from opportunities for promotion (Cuddy, Glick, & Beninger, 2011; Kilduff & Day, 1994), to abilities to develop one's network (Casciaro & Lobo, 2008), to capabilities to garner resources (Shane & Cable, 2002). Despite the importance of interpersonal considerations, little is known about the interpersonal consequences of advice-seeking (see Appendix B).

4. Differentiating advice from help and feedback

Importantly, we consider the advice process as distinct from help and feedback-giving (Brooks et al., 2015), with unique relational effects. First, because providing help (as opposed to advice) enables one to gain some control over the situation, when helpers provide assistance, their assessments of seekers' decisions (and thus of the seeker) will be confounded with the success of the helper's own actions. In advice contexts, the source of guidance (the advisor) and the source of the decision (the seeker) are separate and clear. Second, in contrast to help, advisors provide advice before seekers decide whether to use it. Advisors' reactions thus occur after advisors have expended effort for the seeker. Third, the value of what is exchanged is generally more

subjective in the advice domain than in the help domain. Whereas advice seekers often approach advisors because their next step is not obvious, and thus may receive recommendations with which they disagree, help seekers are often aware of what would improve their situations (e.g. a loan, a babysitter). While prior work has investigated the interpersonal consequences of help-seeking (Bohns & Flynn, 2010; Deelstra et al., 2003; Flynn & Lake, 2008), the only study to investigate helpers' reactions to recipients' acceptance of help entailed the provision of objectively valuable assistance generated by the experimenters (Rosen, Mickler, & Collins, 1987). In addition, we extend our investigation beyond the interpersonal consequences of ignoring advice by also considering the relational impact of mere perceptions that one's advice may be ignored.

Relatedly, research on the interpersonal aspects of feedback (Ashford & Tsui, 1991; Ashford, Blatt, & Walle, 2003; Callister, Kramer, & Turban, 1999; Morrison & Bies, 1991) can also be distinguished from advice. In contrast to the *prospective* focus of advice, which seeks guidance about a choice to be made in the future, feedback communicates a *retrospective* evaluation of a previous judgment, decision, or performance (Ashford, 1986; Ilgen, Fisher, & Taylor, 1979). Accordingly, by definition, feedback interactions require an assessment of the seeker's previous behavior. The evaluative nature of feedback inherently colors feedback-givers' impressions of the receiver, regardless of the recipient's receptivity to the feedback he or she receives.

5. The interpersonal consequences of advice seeker decisions: Predictions

Most people hold positive views of themselves and their opinions (Hoorens, 1995; Mullen, 1983), and egocentrism is very prevalent in judgment (Epley, Keysar, Van Boven, & Gilovich, 2004; Gilovich, Medvec, & Savitsky, 2000; Williams & Steffel, 2014), which impedes perspective-taking (Epley, Caruso, & Bazerman, 2006; Neale & Bazerman, 1983; Thompson & Loewenstein, 1992). As a result, advisors are prone to believing that their advice is good. Thus, when advisees disregard the advice they receive, advisors' egos are likely to be threatened. The fact that many advice seekers are lower status and less experienced than their advisors (Feng & MacGeorge, 2006) is likely to exacerbate this ego threat. Accordingly, we predict:

H1: Advisors will be offended when they perceive that a seeker has disregarded or ignored their advice.

Ignoring an advisor's advice is likely to influence advisors' perceptions of themselves and of the seeker. Ego threat has been suggested as one of the strongest instigators of anger and aggression (Baumeister, Smart, & Boden, 1996; Stucke & Sporer, 2002). Regardless of whether the threat is intentional, people reduce their feelings of threat by generating negative evaluations of the ego offender (Beck, 1999; Blakely, 1993; Bond, Ruaro, & Wingrove, 2006; Fein & Spencer, 1997; Gibbons & McCoy, 1991; Leary, Twenge, & Quinlivan, 2006), ranging from judgments of inaccuracy (Pepitone & Wilpizeski, 1960) to unattractiveness (Horton & Sedikides, 2009). In the current work, we focus on assessments of warmth and competence, as these dimensions largely guide people's cognitive, emotional, and behavioral reactions to others (Cuddy et al., 2008). We additionally investigate perceptions of seeker carelessness to more directly capture the nuance of the advice context. Advisors may view people who ignore their advice as less thoughtful (more careless), again, because they egocentrically believe that thoughtful, careful decision makers would heed their advice.

People also continually update evaluations of their social worth (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Heatherton & Polivy, 1991; Rubin & Hewstone, 1998). When one's advice is not followed, it could be interpreted as a signal of waning influence or respect. Accordingly, advisors are likely to consider the social consequences of others' decisions not to follow their advice. Taken together, we predict:

H2a: Advisors will judge themselves as less capable and respected when they perceive that a seeker has ignored or disregarded their advice.
H2b: Advisors will judge seekers whom they perceive as ignoring or disregarding their advice as less warm, less competent, and more careless than seekers perceived to follow their advice.

Advisor's negative assessments of the seeker are also likely to impact an advisor's relationship with the seeker. When people have a negative opinion of someone, they are also less likely to help (Carnevale, Pruitt, & Carrington, 1982) or interact with (Casciaro & Lobo, 2008) them in the future. Secondly, people feel less close to and are less likely to help those they view as dissimilar (Berscheid & Reis, 1998; Levine, Prosser, Evans, & Reicher, 2005; Liviatan, Trope, & Liberman, 2008; Sedikides, Campbell, Reader, & Elliot, 1999; Singh & Ho, 2000). Such feelings of dissimilarity are likely to result when advisors perceive that their advice was deemed insufficient. Separately, people are more likely to help those who may be able to help them in the future (Blau, 1968; Carnevale et al., 1982; Emerson, 1976). Advisors are unlikely to believe seekers they judge as incompetent or disrespectful could help them in the future. Accordingly, we hypothesize:

H3a: Advisors will interpersonally distance themselves from seekers whom they perceive as ignoring or disregarding their advice.
H3b: Advisors' lowered perceptions of themselves and of the seeker when their advice has been ignored will mediate advisors' interpersonal distancing from seekers.

We operationalize interpersonal distancing in three ways: advisors' felt closeness, advisors' willingness to continue interacting with the advice seeker, and advisors' willingness to continue providing advice to the advice seeker. Seekers likely value advisors' willingness to provide additional advice. People frequently approach the same people for advice over time, and gain efficiency by developing an understanding of the types of knowledge each advisor possesses (Gibbons, 2004; Mathieu, Heffner, Goodwin, Salas, & Cannon-Bowers, 2000; McDonald & Westphal, 2003). Thus, when an advisor is less willing to provide a seeker with advice in the future, the seeker will have to expend significant energy rebuilding this network knowledge.

Next, we consider how two commonly recommended advice-seeking strategies may be affected by the aforementioned effects: seeking advice from experts (Sniezek, Schrah, & Dalal, 2004; Yaniv & Kleinberger, 2000), and seeking advice from multiple advisors (Johnson et al., 2001; Soll, 1999; Surowiecki, 2004).

People frequently seek advice from those with expertise (Hofmann et al., 2009; Jungermann & Fischer, 2005; Nadler et al., 2003). Indeed, many industries are built upon this phenomenon, such as the medical, financial, and legal fields. Experts are likely to be confident about and personally identify with the advice they provide. In addition, experts may gain status, power, and confidence from holding and displaying expertise (Jones & Manev, 2006; Magee & Galinsky, 2008). Thus, experts have more to lose – both privately and publicly – when their advice is ignored. Accordingly, we expect that expert advisors will be especially likely to denigrate those who reject their advice, and experience greater threat when their advice is not followed. Thus, we predict:

H4: Advisors with high expertise will have stronger interpersonal reactions to seekers' advice-taking decisions than advisors with low expertise.

Separately from seeking out advisors with expertise, advice seekers are commonly urged to consult many advisors to exploit the wisdom of crowds (Simmons et al., 2011; Surowiecki, 2004). Assuming advice is not perfectly correlated (a requirement for leveraging the wisdom of crowds) (Simmons et al., 2011), each additional advisor a seeker recruits will reduce the likelihood that the seeker will follow the advice of

a particular advisor. We propose that advisors will react negatively to this reduced perception that their advice will be followed, in line with our prior reasoning.

> *H5a: Advisors will have stronger negative interpersonal reactions to seekers who seek advice from multiple advisors than to those who seek advice from a single advisor.*
>
> *H5b: Perceptions that their advice will not be followed will mediate advisors' interpersonal distancing from seekers who consult multiple advisors.*

Thus far, we have hypothesized that advisors will penalize advice seekers who ignore their advice. This effect may seem foreseeable to the typical advice seeker, yet the common frequency with which advice seekers ignore the advice they receive (over half of those we surveyed had ignored advice in the past month, see Appendix A), suggests that advice seekers may fail to anticipate the negative interpersonal consequences of soliciting and ignoring advice. We propose that the disconnect between advice-seeker actions and advisor reactions is driven by contrasting egocentric perspectives (Epley et al., 2004; Gilovich et al., 2000; Williams & Steffel, 2014), which alter each actor's beliefs about the purpose of an advice exchange. Information gathering is a primary goal of advice-seeking (Yaniv, 2004). Although many advice seekers may also be interested in an advisor's recommendation, people tend to react negatively to being told what to do, limiting the extent to which seekers are interested in receiving explicit direction (Brehm, 1966; Fitzsimons & Lehmann, 2004). Advisors, on the other hand, (often mistakenly) believe that the seeker views them as uniquely capable of providing guidance about the issue at hand (Brooks et al., 2015). Accordingly, advisors are unlikely to view themselves as mere conduits information, but rather, as trusted guides to navigating the advice seeker's situation. Thus, we hypothesize:

> *H6: Compared to advisors, seekers will view the purpose of an advice interaction as more about gathering information (i.e., more about expanding and less about narrowing their set of options).*

The differential focus on information versus guidance may drive a wedge between advisors' and seekers' beliefs that an advisor's advice will be followed. Information gathering will tend to broaden a seeker's considered option set, thus reducing the likelihood that he or she will pursue any given alternative. Conversely, guidance is focused on narrowing the set of options under consideration, increasing the likelihood that a specific option will be chosen. Accordingly, if advisors view the interaction as relatively guidance-focused, they will be inclined to believe that a seeker will leave the interaction with a greater likelihood of following their recommendation. In contrast, if seekers view the interaction as relatively information-focused, they will be inclined to leave the interaction without such a belief. This disconnect could expose advice seekers to unanticipated interpersonal backlash.

6. Overview of the current research

We tested our hypotheses across nine studies. We begin with a pilot study of expert financial advisors who reported their tendency to interpersonally distance themselves from those who disregard their advice (Pilot Study). In Studies 1A-C, we assess advisors' reactions when seekers take versus ignore their advice (H1, H3a). Study 2 provides evidence of the mechanisms underlying these reactions: negative perceptions of the advice seeker and the self (H2a, H2b, H3b). In Study 3, we investigate the moderating role of advisor expertise (H4), and in Studies 4A and B, we consider advisor reactions when seekers consult multiple advisors (H5a, H5b). Lastly, in Study 5, we assess the asymmetry between the advice seeker's and advisor's perspectives (H6).

For each study, we pre-specified our sample sizes. We report all data exclusions, manipulations, and measures. In online studies, we sought

to attain a sample size of at least 100 participants in each between-subjects condition, consistent with recent thinking on appropriate sample sizes (Simmons, 2014). Data and stimuli are posted: https://osf.io/gvy5p/.

7. Pilot Study: Ignoring my professional advice (Field Survey)

We first explore whether professional advisors interpersonally distance themselves from seekers who do not follow their advice by asking financial advisors whether they would fire clients who do not follow their advice. Such a pattern would be particularly noteworthy given financial advisors' financial incentive to keep their clients.

7.1. Method

Participants. We recruited 101 financial advisors (52.5% male, $M_{age} = 34.8$, $SD = 9.70$, $M_{YearsExperience} = 8.23$, $SD = 5.73$) from a Qualtrics panel. We restricted recruitment to those who had the authority to initiate and end client relationships.

Design. First, we asked participants, "Have you ever ended your working relationship with a client after the client didn't follow your advice?" For those who answered "no", we asked participants whether they would consider ending their working relationship with a client who ignored their advice, then whether they had ever distanced themselves from such clients, and lastly, whether they would consider distancing themselves from such clients. We followed up each of the questions to which participants answered "yes" with an open ended "why" question. Participants then reported their years of experience, age, and gender.

7.2. Results

Over half of the financial advisors (52.5%) indicated that they had fired a client after that client had ignored their advice. Although the remaining 47.5% of advisors indicated that they had never done this, many of these advisors indicated that they would consider doing so in the future (27.1%), and that although they had not fired such clients, many of these advisors indicated that they had distanced themselves from such clients (22.9%), or would consider doing so in the future (12.5%).

7.3. Discussion

These data provide initial evidence that advisors often interpersonally punish those who do not follow their advice, with some even imposing the ultimate punishment: severing the relationship. Over half of the financial advisors had ended their relationship with a client who had ignored their advice, at their own expense (losing income from the client). Study 1A considers whether this effect surfaces across a broader set of contexts.

8. Study 1A: Ignoring my advice (Multiple Contexts)

In Study 1A, we assessed advisor reactions to their advice being ignored (versus taken) across a broad array of professional and personal situations using a recall task. Although the specific situations participants recalled varied based on whether they were asked to recall a situation in which their advice was taken or dismissed, the design enabled us to evaluate several characteristics of the advice exchange that may alter advisors' reactions, enabling us to rule these out as explanations for the effect. The design also enabled us to document the prevalence of seekers' decisions to ignore the advice they received in the real world (no participant expressed difficulty in recalling a situation in which their advice was ignored).

8.1. Method

Participants. Participants (N = 196; 43% male, M_{age} = 31.32, SD = 10.4) recruited from Prolific Academic completed this study in exchange for a small fixed payment.

Design. Participants were asked to recall and write about a time they gave advice that was either followed or not followed (instructions included as Appendix C) (Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee, 2003; Schaerer, Tost, Huang, Gino, & Larrick, 2018). The responses averaged 929 characters (SD = 554), and the number of characters did not significantly differ between conditions.

Participants then completed interpersonal measures: how offended they were after the interaction (7 items e.g. "I was insulted" (α = 0.93) from Harinck, Shafa, Ellemers, & Beersma, 2013), change in relational closeness (closeness before and after giving advice, from Schaerer et al., 2018), and willingness to continue the advice relationship (3 items e.g. "I would give [the advisee] advice in the future." (α = 0.91) (we include the full scales as Appendix D).

Next, participants recorded several characteristics of the advice exchange they had recalled. We use these variables as controls in our analysis to account for the potential differences in the situations participants recalled across our conditions: a binary variable indicating whether the situation ultimately worked out well (M = 0.65, SD = 0.48), the relative status and power of their advice exchange counterpart, assessed on a scale of -1 = counterpart had lower status/power, 0 = counterpart had equal status/power, 1 = counterpart had more status/power (Schaerer et al., 2018) (M_{status} = -0.05, SD_{status} = 0.40; M_{power} = 0.00, SD_{power} = 0.32), whether the advice was in the personal (coded as 1) or professional domain (coded as 0) (M = 0.82, SD = 0.39), the relative age of their counterpart (coded as 1 = younger by 5 + years, 0 = about the same age, -1 = older by 5 + years) (M = 0.02, SD = 0.60), and gender of their counterpart (M_{male} = 0.43, SD = 0.50).

8.2. Results

Advisors whose advice was not followed were more offended by the seeker ($M_{Followed}$ = 1.40, $SD_{Followed}$ = 0.78, $M_{NotFollowed}$ = 3.34, $SD_{NotFollowed}$ = 1.50), $t(1\,9\,4)$ = 11.42, $p < .01$, d = 1.63, felt less close to the seeker ($M_{Followed}$ = 5.67, $SD_{Followed}$ = 1.44, $M_{NotFollowed}$ = 4.91, $SD_{NotFollowed}$ = 1.87), $t(1\,9\,4)$ = 3.20, $p < .01$, d = 0.46, and were less willing to continue the advice relationship with the seeker ($M_{Followed}$ = 6.34, $SD_{Followed}$ = 0.88, $M_{NotFollowed}$ = 4.74, $SD_{NotFollowed}$ = 1.88), $t(1\,9\,4)$ = 7.67, $p < .01$, d = 1.09. In a regression predicting post-interaction closeness, including pre-interaction closeness as a covariate to evaluate the change in closeness, the effect of not following advice was negative and significant ($\beta_{NotFollowed}$ = -0.96, $p < .01$).

We evaluated the robustness of these findings by predicting advisor reactions when their advice was ignored, controlling for the various advice exchange characteristics we captured (outcome, power, status, domain, age, and gender). Even when controlling for characteristics of both the scenario and of the advisor and seeker, advisors whose advice was ignored interpersonally distanced themselves significantly more than advisors whose advice was followed. Our regression results are summarized in Table 1.

8.3. Discussion

Study 1A provides initial evidence that advisors may penalize those who ignore their advice across a diverse array of real-world contexts, and that these effects are robust to many characteristics of the advice exchange. We build upon these findings and test the directionality of the effect in a controlled experiment in Study 1B.

9. Study 1B: Ignoring my advice (Experiment)

9.1. Method

Participants. Participants (N = 292; 41.5% male, M_{age} = 29.8, SD = 11.8) from a northeastern university in the United States completed this study as part of a lab session in exchange for $5.

Design. Participants were assigned to one of three conditions: imagine they gave advice to a colleague, and that their advice was followed, not followed, or they did not know whether it was followed (control condition). They were told:

> "Imagine one of your more junior colleagues, John, approaches you for career advice. You and John are not on the same team, but you work in a similar area, and encounter one another multiple times each day at work. You take a few hours to reflect on and document what has been helpful thus far, and you schedule time to meet with John in the next week. At your meeting, you walk through a specific plan that you think John could follow to be successful. When you leave, John thanks you for the advice and says, "I look forward to keeping in touch in the future." John ends up [does not end up] taking your advice. [You do not know whether John ended up taking your advice.]"

Participants then completed the same three interpersonal dependent measures as in Study 1A (order counterbalanced between subjects): how offended they were after the interaction (α = 0.95), change in relational closeness, and willingness to continue the advice relationship (α = 0.89). Next, participants completed a comprehension check ("Did John take your advice?" with responses "Yes," "No," and "I don't know"). This and all remaining studies concluded with basic demographic questions (age and gender).

9.2. Results

A one-way ANOVA revealed that the conditions significantly differed across all three interpersonal measures ($F_{Offense}$ = 52.8, $p_{Offense} < 0.01$, $\eta^2_{Offense}$ = 0.27; $F_{Closeness}$ = 25.3, $p_{Closeness} < 0.01$, $\eta^2_{Closeness}$ = 0.15; $F_{More\ Advice}$ = 61.3, $p_{More\ Advice} < .01$, $\eta^2_{More\ Advice}$ = 0.30). Post hoc Tukey tests revealed that this difference was driven by comparisons between the "not followed" condition and the control condition for post-interaction closeness ($M_{NotFollowed}$ = 3.70, $SD_{NotFollowed}$ = 1.04, $M_{Control}$ = 4.46, $SD_{Control}$ = 1.00), $p < .01$, d = 0.75. In contrast, advisors who did not know whether their advice was followed were not significantly less close with the seeker than advisors whose advice was followed ($M_{Followed}$ = 4.69, $SD_{Followed}$ = 1.00), p = .27, d = 0.23.

For the other two interpersonal measures, post hoc Tukey tests indicated that the control condition differed from both the "followed" and "not followed" conditions. Compared with those who did not know whether their advice was followed, participants who imagined their advice was not followed were more offended by the seeker ($M_{NotFollowed}$ = 3.26, $SD_{NotFollowed}$ = 1.25, $M_{Control}$ = 2.12, $SD_{Control}$ = 1.17), $p < .01$, d = 0.94 and were less willing to give more advice to the seeker ($M_{NotFollowed}$ = 4.07, $SD_{NotFollowed}$ = 1.29, $M_{Control}$ = 5.22, $SD_{Control}$ = 1.06), $p < .01$, d = 0.97. Conversely, when compared with those who did not know whether their advice was followed, participants who imagined their advice *was* followed were less offended by the seeker ($M_{Followed}$ = 1.61, $SD_{Followed}$ = 0.97), $p < .01$, d = 0.48, and were more willing to give more advice to the seeker ($M_{Followed}$ = 5.87, $SD_{Followed}$ = 1.05), $p < .01$, d = 0.62. These results were equally – or became more - significant when we excluded the 10% of participants who failed the comprehension check (more participants in the control condition (21%) did not pass the comprehension check than in either the followed (6%) or not followed (3%) conditions, χ^2 = 19.53, $p < .01$, which we believe may be due to participant concerns about selecting "I don't know" as the correct response).

Table 1
Advisors interpersonally distance themselves from seekers who do not follow their advice (controlling for a variety of situational and personal characteristics).

Independent Variables	Dependent Variable					
	Advisor Offense		Post Interaction Closeness		Willingness to Continue Advice Relationship	
Condition						
Advice Not Followed	1.362	**	−0.797	**	−1.036	**
Characteristics of Situation						
Good Outcome	−0.913	**	0.258		1.021	**
Structural Power of Counterpart	−0.134		−0.196		0.370	
Comparative Status of Counterpart	−0.049		−0.031		0.245	
Personal Domain (vs. Professional)	−0.173		0.240		−0.103	
Characteristics of Advisor & Seeker						
Pre-Interaction Closeness	−0.042		0.661	**	0.351	**
Relative Age	0.039		0.132		−0.145	
Seeker Female	−0.162		0.228		−0.190	
Participant Female	0.183		−0.288		−0.042	
Same Gender	0.150		−0.074		0.013	
Constant	2.526	**	1.809	**	3.711	**
R^2	0.461		0.474		0.408	
Adjusted R^2	0.432		0.446		0.376	
n	196		196		196	

$^{\dagger}p < .10$, $^* p < .05$, $^{**} p < .01$.

9.3. Discussion

Study 1B provides evidence that advisors interpersonally punish seekers for ignoring their advice (H1, H3a), in addition to rewarding them for following it. In Study 1C, we investigate advisors' behavioral reactions when their advice is ignored in an interactive advice-giving context.

10. Study 1C: Ignoring my advice (Interactive Experiment)

10.1. Method

Participants. Participants (N = 143; 46% male, M_{age} = 38.0, SD = 12.0) from Amazon Mechanical Turk completed a partnered study in exchange for $1.00 and the opportunity to earn a $0.40 bonus. An additional 53 people were recruited for the study but were unable to complete the task because they were not matched with a partner or did not have sufficient time to interact. In addition to the focal participants in the study, we recruited 233 people to serve as chat partners. Though these participants interacted with the focal participants, they were not required to complete our dependent measures of interest.

Design. We randomly assigned all participants to the role of advisor (these were the participants of interest) or to the role of advice seeker. Those in the advisor role were further randomly assigned to two conditions (advice followed versus ignored). Those in the seeker role simply served as chat partners, but did not complete our dependent measures of interest.

Those in the advisor role began by completing two tasks ("write a paragraph about your state" and "write two comments about a prior participant's paragraph"). Next, they were told that they would be chatting with a partner and were instructed to answer any questions from their partner to the best of their abilities. Next, advisors were connected to another participant who had been assigned to the advice seeker role via ChatPlat, a web application that enables participants to chat in real time. This application has been used in previous research on human interaction (e.g., Huang, Yeomans, Brooks, Minson, & Gino, 2017; Brooks & Schweitzer, 2011). During their five minute chat, advice seekers told advisors that they needed to choose to complete one of the two tasks that the advisor had already completed. Seekers then asked for advice about which of the two tasks they should choose. After giving advice, advisors were asked which task they had recommended. Advisors then received a study update in which they learned that their partner had chosen the task they recommended (advice followed

condition) or the other task (advice not followed condition).

Advisors were next told that they had the opportunity to earn an additional $0.10 bonus on a joint brainteaser, and that they could select to work with the same partner or a new partner who was on standby. After making this partner selection, participants completed the same three interpersonal measures as in Studies 1A-B (counterbalanced between subjects): advisor offense (α = 0.96), closeness before and after the exchange, and willingness to continue the advice relationship (α = 0.87). Finally, advisors completed two comprehension checks: "Did your partner ask for your advice?" and "Did your partner follow your advice?"

The advice seekers' study experience was different. Seekers first completed a filler task (writing descriptions of three photos), and were told that they would chat with a partner after which they would choose one of two tasks to complete (the same tasks those in the "advisor" condition had actually completed). Seekers were instructed to ask their chat partner which of the two tasks they should complete. Participants in both conditions were instructed not to share their directions with their partner. Seekers were next connected to an advisor via the ChatPlat application. After asking for advice about which task to complete, seekers were told that they would not need to complete either of the two tasks and exited the study.

10.2. Results

Significantly more advisors chose to end their relationship with their partner (chose a new partner for a subsequent task) when their advice was not followed (53%) than when it was followed (23%) (logistic $\beta_{NotFollowed}$ = 1.35, $p < .01$). Participants whose advice was not followed were also more offended by the seeker ($M_{Followed}$ = 1.30, $SD_{Followed}$ = 0.59, $M_{NotFollowed}$ = 1.99, $SD_{NotFollowed}$ = 1.11), t (1 4 1) = 4.64, $p < .01$, d = 0.78, felt less close with the seeker ($M_{Followed}$ = 3.96, $SD_{Followed}$ = 1.27, $M_{NotFollowed}$ = 3.06, $SD_{NotFollowed}$ = 1.60), $t(1 4 1)$ = 3.73, $p < .01$, d = 0.62, and were less willing to continue the advice relationship with the seeker ($M_{Followed}$ = 5.78, $SD_{Followed}$ = 0.90, $M_{NotFollowed}$ = 4.68, $SD_{NotFollowed}$ = 1.62), t (1 4 1) = 5.04, $p < .01$, d = 0.84. These results are depicted in Fig. 1.

In a regression predicting post-interaction closeness, including pre-interaction closeness as a covariate to evaluate the change in closeness, the effect of not following advice was negative and significant ($\beta_{NotFollowed}$ = -0.81, $p < .01$). These results held when we excluded the two participants who failed the comprehension checks (the failure rate did not differ across conditions).

Fig. 1. Advisors interpersonally distance themselves from seekers who do not follow their advice. Error bars represent ± 1 standard error.

10.3. Discussion

Study 1C illustrates the behavioral effects that can result when a seeker does not follow an advisor's advice: replicating the results from Studies 1A-B in an interactive domain, over half of the advisors whose advice was not followed chose to end their relationships with the seeker. Study 1C also shows that within a real advice setting, advisors are offended by and interpersonally punish seekers who do not take their advice (H1, H3a). In Study 2, we investigate the psychological mechanisms underlying this main effect.

11. Study 2: Ignoring my advice (Mechanisms)

In Study 2, we explore why advisors distance themselves from seekers who do not take their advice, testing whether the effect is driven by advisors' self-perceptions, advisors' perceptions of the seeker, or both (H2a, H2b). We predicted that seekers' failure to heed advisors' advice would tarnish both advisors' self-perceptions and their perceptions of the seeker, in turn causing relational distancing (H3b).

11.1. Method

Participants. Participants (N = 316; 51% male, M_{age} = 37.8, SD = 12.5) from Amazon Mechanical Turk completed this study in exchange for $0.30.

Design. Participants imagined that they gave career advice to a colleague using the same scenario as Study 1B and were randomly assigned to imagine that the colleague either followed or did not follow the advice.

Participants then completed the same three interpersonal measures as in Studies 1A-C: offense (α = 0.97), closeness before and after the exchange, and willingness to continue the advice relationship (α = 0.94), as well as the five hypothesized mediators. The first three of these measures focused on advisors' opinions of the seeker. We asked participants to rate the seeker's warmth (warm, nice, friendly, sincere) (α = 0.95), competence (competent, confidence, skillful, able) (α = 0.91) (Cuddy et al., 2008), and carelessness using a 12-item scale (Mishra & Mishra, 2010) (e.g. careless, impulsive, responsible (R)) (α = 0.84) using a scale of 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*). The remaining measures assessed advisors' self-views. We assessed advisors' self-perceived ineptitude using a three-item semantic differential scale (capable-incapable, unknowledgeable-knowledgeable, ineffective-effective) (Hysom, 2009) (α = 0.93), and self-perceived social worth, using an 8-item scale (e.g. "I feel inferior to others at this moment," "I am worried about looking foolish") (Heatherton & Polivy, 1991) (α = 0.91) using a scale of 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*). The presentation order of these eight measures was counterbalanced

between subjects.

11.2. Results

Consistent with our prior findings, compared to participants whose advice was followed, participants whose advice was not followed were more offended by the seeker ($M_{Followed}$ = 1.54, $SD_{Followed}$ = 0.99, $M_{NotFollowed}$ = 3.34, $SD_{NotFollowed}$ = 1.45), $t(3 1 4)$ = 12.8, $p < .01$, $d = 1.45$, felt less close with the seeker ($M_{Followed}$ = 5.25, $SD_{Followed}$ = 1.01, $M_{NotFollowed}$ = 3.01, $SD_{NotFollowed}$ = 1.30), $t(3 1 4)$ = 17.1, $p < .01$, $d = 1.93$, and were less willing to continue the advice relationship with the seeker ($M_{Followed}$ = 5.96, $SD_{Followed}$ = 0.89, $M_{NotFollowed}$ = 3.70, $SD_{NotFollowed}$ = 1.57), $t(3 1 4)$ = 15.7, $p < .01$, $d = 1.77$. In a regression predicting post-interaction closeness, including pre-interaction closeness as a covariate to evaluate the change in closeness, the effect of not following advice was negative and significant ($\beta_{NotFollowed}$ = -2.26, $p < .01$).

We also found significant differences in all of our hypothesized mediator variables. Relative to when their advice was followed, participants whose advice was not followed rated seekers as less warm ($M_{Followed}$ = 5.66, $SD_{Followed}$ = 0.86, $M_{NotFollowed}$ = 4.15, $SD_{NotFollowed}$ = 1.05), $t(3 1 4)$ = 14.0, $p < .01$, $d = 1.58$, less competent ($M_{Followed}$ = 5.46, $SD_{Followed}$ = 0.88, $M_{NotFollowed}$ = 4.43, $SD_{NotFollowed}$ = 1.06), $t(3 1 4)$ = 9.4, $p < .01$, $d = 1.05$, and more careless ($M_{Followed}$ = 3.07, $SD_{Followed}$ = 0.62, $M_{NotFollowed}$ = 3.99, $SD_{NotFollowed}$ = 0.71), $t(3 1 4)$ = 12.3, $p < .01$, $d = 1.39$. Participants whose advice was not followed also rated themselves as more inept ($M_{Followed}$ = 1.97, $SD_{Followed}$ = 1.04, $M_{NotFollowed}$ = 2.62, $SD_{NotFollowed}$ = 1.32), $t(3 1 4)$ = 4.86, $p < .01$, $d = 0.55$, and were more concerned about their social worth ($M_{Followed}$ = 3.06, $SD_{Followed}$ = 1.19, $M_{NotFollowed}$ = 3.41, $SD_{NotFollowed}$ = 1.28), $t(3 1 4)$ = 2.49, $p = .01$, $d = 0.28$ than those whose advice was followed.

Mediation analyses. We conducted a factor analysis of our hypothesized mediators using principal components analysis with varimax and oblimin rotations. We found that they loaded onto two factors which explained 78% of the variance: one factor related to perceptions of the seeker and another related to advisor self-perceptions. We next created composite scores for each of these two factors, and evaluated these as mediators of the relationship between following advice and interpersonal distancing. To test mediation, we used the bias-corrected bootstrap method recommended by Preacher and Hayes (2004).

We assessed the two factors as dual mediators of the relationship between an advisor's advice being followed and the advisor's offense, and found that the indirect mediation model 95% confidence interval did not contain zero for either the seeker perceptions factor [−0.8298, −0.4340] or the advisor self-perceptions factor [−0.4113, −0.1399], indicating significant dual mediation.

We additionally analyzed the two factors as dual mediators of the relationship between an advisor's advice being followed and the change in relational closeness, by estimating post-interaction closeness while including pre-interaction closeness as a covariate, and found that the indirect mediation model 95% confidence interval did not contain zero for the seeker perceptions factor [0.6761, 1.1706], indicating significant mediation, although it did contain zero for the advisor self-perceptions factor [−0.0408, 0.0777]. When we analyzed each of these factors as mediators independently, however, they did individually mediate the relationship between an advisor's advice being followed and the change in relational closeness (the indirect mediation model 95% confidence interval was [0.7157, 1.1681] for the seeker perceptions factor, and [0.0381, 0.2070] for the advisor self-perceptions factor).

We next assessed the two factors as dual mediators of the relationship between an advisor's advice being followed and the advisor's willingness to continue the advice relationship with the seeker, and found that the indirect mediation model 95% confidence interval did not contain zero for either the perceived-seeker factor [0.7225, 1.2492]

Fig. 2. The relationship between one's advice being followed and interpersonal distancing is mediated by both advisors' perceptions of the seeker and the self.

or the advisor self-perceptions factor [0.0181, 0.1815], indicating significant dual mediation. We depict this mediation path in Fig. 2.

11.3. Discussion

Study 2 shows that when seekers do not follow an advisor's advice, advisors react with more negative perceptions of both themselves and of the seeker (H2a, H2b), and that these decreased perceptions lead advisors to interpersonally distance themselves from those who ignore their advice (H3b).

In Studies 3, 4A, and 4B, we consider the impact of this main effect on two recommended advice-seeking strategies. In Study 3, we consider the potential interpersonal consequences of seeking advice from expert advisors, and in Studies 4A and 4B, we investigate the consequences of seeking advice from multiple advisors (i.e., leveraging the wisdom of crowds).

12. Study 3: Advisor expertise moderates

In Study 3, we investigate whether expert advisors react differently from non-expert advisors when their advice is ignored. As experts are likely to be more confident in and personally identified with the advice they provide, and gain status and power from holding expertise (Jones & Manev, 2006; Magee & Galinsky, 2008), we hypothesized that expert advisors would react more strongly to advice seekers' advice-taking decisions (H4).

12.1. Method

Participants. We recruited participants (N = 603) from Amazon Mechanical Turk to complete this study in exchange for $0.30 and the opportunity to earn an additional $0.60.

Design. The study followed a 2 (expert vs. non-expert) X 2 (advice followed vs. advice not followed) experimental design. Following Brooks et al.'s (2015) manipulation of expertise, participants answered questions about their own areas of expertise and weakness before being asked for advice in their area of self-identified high expertise (expert condition) or in their area of self-identified low expertise (non-expert condition).

We first told participants that they would be completing the study with a partner, and asked them to fill out a profile (name, occupation, state, and short sentence about their favorite food) to share with their partner. We next asked prospective participants to list up to six musical instruments they were familiar with, select the U.S. states in which they had lived, traveled, or visited regularly, list up to six sports that they watched or played regularly, and list up to six current events about which they had heard or read. Next, we asked participants to indicate which of the four categories (musical instruments, U.S. geography, sports, or current events) they were most knowledgeable and least knowledgeable about, and how knowledgeable they felt about each on a scale of 1 = none at all to 5 = a great deal. To ensure the validity of our expertise manipulation, we excluded those in the "expert" condition who indicated a level of knowledge three or below (45% of these participants), and those in the "non-expert" condition who indicated a level of knowledge three or above (17% of these participants), yielding a sample of 168 "experts" and 247 "non-experts" (N = 415; 56% male, $M_{age} = 36.3$, $SD = 11.2$).

Next, participants were told, "You or your partner will be randomly selected to complete a Brain Teaser. The Brain Teaser is a question related to one of the above topic areas and measures knowledge, creativity, and intelligence." After a brief waiting period, participants saw a page with their partner's profile, which included the same information they had disclosed, as well as their own profile information. Although participants were not matched with a real partner (but a computer-simulated confederate), we provided this information to enhance the realism of the study, and randomly presented one of four alternatives for each field (e.g. randomly presented four different names) to reduce cross contamination.

Next, we told participants, "For your team, your partner was randomly assigned to complete the Brain Teaser. The topic of the brain teaser is [topic of participant's high or low expertise (randomly assigned)]." Participants were told that their partner had reviewed the expertise domain questions the participant had filled out, and decided to ask the participant for advice. Participants next received a message from their "partner" asking for advice on a question related to either the participant's domain of expertise or weakness. For example, participants received the message "The question is about musical instruments, which I saw you rated highly [didn't rate highly]. The brain teaser is asking whether the piano or the trumpet can make a wider range of pitches. Do you have any advice about this question?" This page included both a text box for participants to write their advice and a multiple choice question with two possible choices to select their answer (e.g. in this condition "Trumpet" or "Guitar"). After writing their advice and completing this multiple choice question, participants were

told to wait while their partner completed the brainteaser, and subsequently saw the brainteaser and their partner's answer. Next, half of participants were randomized to see either that their partner's answer matched their recommendation (their advice was followed) or that their partner's answer was the opposite from the participant's recommendation (their advice was not followed).

Participants were next asked to answer several questions about the advice seeker. Participants completed the same three interpersonal measures as in Studies 1A-C and 2: advisor offense ($\alpha = 0.96$), closeness before and after the exchange, and willingness to continue the advice relationship ($\alpha = 0.92$), which were counterbalanced between subjects. Participants completed several comprehension checks (whether the brainteaser had been a topic they were knowledgeable about, whether their partner asked for their advice, and whether their partner followed their advice) (84% passed). We also asked participants how confident they felt about the advice they had given as a robustness check.

12.2. Results

Expert advisors were significantly more confident about the advice they provided than non-expert advisors ($M_{Expert} = 5.86$, $SD_{Expert} = 1.55$, $M_{Non-Expert} = 3.69$, $SD_{Non-Expert} = 1.93$), $t(4\,1\,3) = 12.16$, $p < .01$, $d = 1.24$, indicating our manipulation was effective. Expert advisor advice (i.e. their recommended multiple choice response) was also more correct (88%) than non-expert advice (73%) (logistic $\beta_{Expert} = 0.99$, $p < .01$).

Offense. A two-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed two main effects and an interaction. Overall, advisors whose advice was not followed were more offended than those whose advice was followed, replicating our main effect ($M_{Followed} = 1.48$, $SD_{Followed} = 0.84$, $M_{NotFollowed} = 2.29$, $SD_{NotFollowed} = 1.34$), $F(1, 414) = 63.21$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = 0.13$. Expert advisors were also more offended than non-experts ($M_{Expert} = 2.03$, $SD_{Expert} = 1.30$, $M_{Non-Expert} = 1.77$, $SD_{Non-Expert} = 1.09$), $F(1, 414) = 8.55$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = 0.02$. These effects were qualified by a significant interaction ($F(1, 414) = 5.94$, $p = .02$, $\eta^2 = 0.01$) driven by expert advisors' especially strong reaction to their advice not being followed. Whereas non-expert advisors were significantly more offended when their advice was not followed than when it was followed ($M_{Followed} = 1.46$, $SD_{Followed} = 0.75$, $M_{NotFollowed} = 2.06$, $SD_{NotFollowed} = 1.27$), $t(2\,4\,5) = 4.6$, $p < .01$, $d = 0.58$, this effect was stronger for expert advisors ($M_{Followed} = 1.51$, $SD_{Followed} = 0.94$, $M_{NotFollowed} = 2.65$, $SD_{NotFollowed} = 1.39$), $t(1\,6\,6) = 6.31$, $p < .01$, $d = 0.96$.

Closeness. A two-way ANOVA of post-interaction closeness revealed that advisors whose advice was not followed felt less close to the seeker ($M_{NotFollowed} = 3.00$, $SD_{NotFollowed} = 1.60$) than advisors whose advice was followed ($M_{Followed} = 4.55$, $SD_{Followed} = 1.44$), $F(1, 414) = 109.28$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = 0.21$. There was no main effect of expertise ($M_{Expert} = 3.83$, $SD_{Expert} = 1.75$, $M_{Non-Expert} = 3.77$, $SD_{Non-Expert} = 1.68$), $F(1, 414) = 0.08$, $p = .78$, $\eta^2 < 0.01$. Both non-experts ($M_{Followed} = 4.49$, $SD_{Followed} = 1.43$, $M_{NotFollowed} = 3.08$, $SD_{NotFollowed} = 1.61$), $t(2\,4\,5) = 7.3$, $p < .01$, $d = 0.93$, and experts ($M_{Followed} = 4.63$, $SD_{Followed} = 1.47$, $M_{NotFollowed} = 2.86$, $SD_{NotFollowed} = 1.57$), $t(1\,6\,6) = 7.6$, $p < .01$, $d = 1.17$ felt significantly less close with seekers who did not follow their advice. Although the effect size was larger for expert advisors, there was no significant interaction between expertise and advice-taking on closeness ($F(1, 414) = 1.41$, $p = .24$, $\eta^2 < 0.01$). In a regression predicting post-interaction closeness, including pre-interaction closeness as a covariate to evaluate the change in closeness, the effect of advice being followed was similar, and the effect of expertise became significant ($\beta_{Followed} = 1.53$, $p < .01$, $\beta_{Expert} = -0.48$, $p = .02$, $\beta_{Followed \, X \, Expert} = 0.43$, p = .11).

Willingness to Give More Advice. A two-way ANOVA indicated that advisors whose advice was not followed were also less willing to give more advice to the seeker ($M_{NotFollowed} = 4.49$, $SD_{NotFollowed} = 1.64$) than advisors whose advice was followed ($M_{Followed} = 5.94$,

$SD_{Followed} = 0.99$), $F(1, 414) = 126.00$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = 0.23$. There was again no main effect of expertise ($M_{Expert} = 5.18$, $SD_{Expert} = 1.57$, $M_{Non-Expert} = 5.27$, $SD_{Non-Expert} = 1.51$), $F(1, 414) = 2.15$, $p = .14$, $\eta^2 < 0.01$). These effects were qualified by a significant interaction between advice following and expertise ($F(1, 414) = 4.24$, $p = .04$, $\eta^2 = 0.01$), driven by experts' negative reactions to those who did not follow their advice. Non-expert advisors were significantly less willing to give more advice to seekers who did not follow their advice ($M_{Followed} = 5.91$, $SD_{Followed} = 1.02$, $M_{NotFollowed} = 4.67$, $SD_{NotFollowed} = 1.64$), $t(2\,4\,5) = 7.0$, $p < .01$, $d = 0.90$. Yet this effect was stronger for expert advisors ($M_{Followed} = 5.99$, $SD_{Followed} = 0.96$, $M_{NotFollowed} = 4.20$, $SD_{NotFollowed} = 1.60$), $t(1\,6\,6) = 8.94$, $p < .01$, $d = 1.35$. When those who failed the comprehension checks were excluded in the analyses (16%), the results were similarly significant (failure rate did not differ between conditions).

Effects of Confidence and Accuracy. Interestingly, not all of the effects of expertise were driven by advisor confidence. When controlling for advisor confidence, the interaction effect between expertise and following advice remained significant in predicting both advisor offense ($p = .02$) and willingness to give more advice ($p = .05$). When controlling for advisor and seeker accuracy (i.e. whether the advisor (79%) and seeker (53%) chose the correct multiple choice item) the interaction between expertise and following advice remained significant in predicting advisor offense ($p = .04$), but was reduced to marginal significance in predicting willingness to give more advice ($p = .07$).

12.3. Discussion

Study 3 shows that, compared to non-expert advisors, expert advisors react even more negatively when their advice is not followed, taking greater offense, and relationally distancing themselves from the advice seeker to a greater extent. These findings are especially important in light of consensus that the most competent advice seekers choose to ask expert advisors for advice (Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006; Feng & MacGeorge, 2006). Study 3 suggests that such advice seekers may actually receive harsher relational punishment when they choose not to follow the advice they receive from expert advisors.

In Studies 4A and 4B, we consider how advisors' interpersonal distancing from seekers who do not follow their advice may impact their reactions to an even more commonly recommended advice-seeking strategy, consulting multiple advisors to leverage the wisdom of crowds (Simmons et al., 2011; Surowiecki, 2004).

13. Study 4A: Seeking from multiple advisors

Study 4A tests the link between advisors' reactions to those who ignore their advice and advisors' reactions to those who consult multiple advisors. We predicted that when advisors learned that other advisors had been consulted, it would reduce perceptions that their own advice would be followed, leading advisors to interpersonally penalize the seeker (H5a, H5b). In addition to considering interpersonal distancing, we also evaluated advisor perceptions of seeker competence. Seeking advice from multiple advisors is a widely-recommended and popularized advice-seeking strategy (Surowiecki, 2004), but the interpersonal benefits of seeking advice seem to hinge on asking *one* advisor for advice because it is flattering to that advisor specifically (Brooks et al., 2015). If advisors judge multiple advice seekers as *less* competent, it would represent a significant departure from conventional wisdom about leveraging the wisdom of crowds. The design of Study 4A uses the contextual features of Amazon Mechanical Turk to test advisors' reactions when seekers ask for advice from one versus multiple advisors.

13.1. Method

Participants. Master Workers (N = 186; 45% male, $M_{age} = 40.10$, $SD = 9.88$) from Amazon Mechanical Turk completed this study in

exchange for $1.00. The "Master Worker" designation is given to highly experienced Amazon Mechanical Turk workers whose work has been judged to be high quality by those who request work on the platform.

Procedure. Master Workers were told, "We are giving new workers an opportunity to get advice from experienced Master Workers, such as yourself," and were instructed that they would be put on a list of advisors if they filled out a short profile including their first name, experience on Amazon Mechanical Turk, and favorite types of tasks to complete on the platform. After a brief wait, participants were told that a novice worker had selected them as an advisor, and read a short profile about the "novice," which included the same information that the participant had filled out (first name, experience on Amazon Mechanical Turk, and favorite types of tasks to complete on the platform). In reality, the novice's messages were pre-programmed.

Next, participants received a message from the novice: "Hello, I'm having trouble finding enough HITs to do to make mTurk worth my time. Do you have any advice about what to do?" and were instructed to write their advice. After submitting their advice, participants completed a short filler task that they believed the novice workers would also complete, and rated how similar the filler task was to other tasks available on the Amazon Mechanical Turk platform. Next, participants were told "*Seeker Name* has read your advice and has decided to ask for advice from 4 [no] additional mTurk experts while s/he completes the next task," indicating that the novice would be pursuing a single or multiple advisor advice-seeking strategy. Participants were next told that they had the opportunity to earn an additional $0.10 bonus on a joint brainteaser, and that they could select to work with either the same novice to whom they had given advice, or another novice who was on standby.

After selecting whom to work with, participants indicated how offended they felt using the same measure as Studies 1–3 ($\alpha = 0.96$), perceptions of the seeker's competence with a three item scale ($\alpha = 0.92$) (Brooks et al., 2015) (e.g. "*Seeker Name* is very capable of solving problems."), and perceptions that the seeker would follow the advisor's advice, using a three item scale (e.g. "I believe *Seeker Name* will take my advice.") ($\alpha = 0.92$), all on a scale of strongly disagree (1) – strongly agree (7). All of the above measures were counterbalanced across conditions. Participants next indicated whether they had expected the seeker to ask other advisors for advice and completed a comprehension check (i.e. whether the seeker had asked multiple advisors for advice), and a suspicion check ("Is there anything you would like to let us know about our study? (Anything weird or suspicious, technical difficulties, etc.)") to identify participants who were suspicious they were not interacting with a real partner), and indicated their age and gender. Finally, participants were fully debriefed. Although participants did not provide advice to a specific novice because the novice role was pre-programmed, they were told that they could opt to have the experimenters share their advice on an online forum relating to Amazon Mechanical Turk so that it could benefit others. After the survey closed, the advice from participants who opted in was posted at https://www.reddit.com/r/mturk/.

13.2. Results

Advisors who learned the seeker had asked others for advice were significantly more likely to end their relationship with the seeker (28%) than advisors who believed they were the only advisor consulted (10%) (logistic $\beta_{Multiple} = 1.23$, $p < .01$). Advisors who believed the seeker consulted others were also more offended ($M_{Multiple} = 1.64$, $SD_{Multiple} = 0.94$, $M_{Single} = 1.39$, $SD_{Single} = 0.70$), $t(184) = 2.07$, $p = .04$, $d = 0.31$, judged the seeker as significantly less competent ($M_{Multiple} = 4.31$, $SD_{Multiple} = 1.13$, $M_{Single} = 4.74$, $SD_{Single} = 1.07$), $t(184) = 2.65$, $p < .01$, $d = 0.39$, and felt their advice was less likely to be followed ($M_{Multiple} = 4.83$, $SD_{Multiple} = 1.23$, $M_{Single} = 5.20$, $SD_{Single} = 1.10$), $t(184) = 2.13$, $p = .03$, $d = 0.31$. However, advisors who learned the seeker had asked others for advice were no less likely

than advisors who thought they were the only person consulted to share their advice with the broader mTurk community on Reddit ($M_{Multiple} = 64\%$, $SD_{Multiple} = 0.48$, $M_{Single} = 61\%$, $SD_{Single} = 0.49$), (logistic $\beta_{Multiple} = 0.12$, $p = .70$), suggesting advisors' negative reactions pertain specifically to the seeker.

We assessed advisor perceptions that their advice would not be followed as a mediator of the relationship between consulting multiple advisors and each of our three dependent variables using the bias-corrected bootstrap method recommended by Preacher and Hayes (2004). The indirect mediation model 95% confidence interval did not contain zero for the model predicting the selection of a different partner [0.0212, 0.5146], advisor offense [0.0001, 0.1013], or seeker competence [−0.3263, −0.0179], indicating significant mediation of all three dependent variables.

These results were consistent when we excluded the 13 (7% of) participants who failed the comprehension or suspicion checks (the failure and suspicion rate did not differ across conditions).

13.3. Discussion

Study 4A suggests that advisors interpersonally punish those who consult multiple advisors for advice because consulting others reduces advisors' belief that their own advice will be followed (H5a, H5b). Furthermore, advisors ironically judged seekers who sought advice from multiple advisors as less competent, though the wisdom of crowds suggests seeking advice from multiple advisors increases judgment accuracy. These results represent an important implication of the effect of advice-taking on the advisor-seeker relationship. Not only do advisors denigrate those who do not follow their advice, but as shown in Study 4A, they interpersonally distance themselves from those who they merely feel are less likely to follow it. In Study 4B, we investigate this effect in everyday advice-giving interactions.

14. Study 4B: Seeking from multiple advisors (Multiple Contexts)

14.1. Method

Participants. Participants (N = 200; 43% male, $M_{age} = 36.38$, SD = 11.01) from Amazon Mechanical Turk completed this study in exchange for $1.00.

Design. Participants were asked to recall a time they been approached by an advice seeker who asked "you for advice about a given issue and asked other people for their advice about the same issue" (multiple advisors condition) or asked "you and only you for advice about a given issue" (single advisor condition) (Schaerer et al., 2018) (instructions included in Appendix C). The responses averaged 882 characters (SD = 496, number of characters did not significantly differ between conditions).

Next, participants were asked to rate their relationship with the seeker using the same interpersonal measures as Studies 1A−2: offense, closeness, and willingness to give more advice ($\alpha_{offense} = 0.94$, $\alpha_{more\ advice} = 0.93$). Participants also rated the seeker's competence, using the same measure as in Study 4A ($\alpha = 0.92$). Participants next indicated the same situational control measures used in Study 1A, a binary variable indicating whether the situation ultimately worked out well ($M = 0.79$, $SD = 0.41$), the relative status and power of their advice exchange counterpart, assessed on a scale of -1 = counterpart had lower status/power, 0 = counterpart had equal status/power, 1 = counterpart had more status/power (Schaerer et al., 2018) ($M_{status} = -0.03$, $SD_{status} = 0.43$; $M_{power} = 0.02$, $SD_{power} = 0.38$), whether the advice was in the personal (coded as 1) or professional domain (coded as 0) ($M = 0.74$, $SD = 0.44$), the relative age of their counterpart (coded as 1 = younger by 5+ years, 0 = about the same age, -1 = older by 5+ years) ($M = 0.05$, $SD = 0.61$), and gender of their counterpart ($M_{male} = 0.44$, $SD = 0.50$).

14.2. Results

Participants who were one of multiple advisors were significantly more offended ($M_{Multiple}$ = 2.41, $SD_{Multiple}$ = 1.58, M_{Single} = 1.64, SD_{Single} = 1.12), $t(1\,9\,8)$ = 4.04, p < .01, d = 0.57, felt less close with the seeker ($M_{Multiple}$ = 5.17, $SD_{Multiple}$ = 1.75, M_{Single} = 5.83, SD_{Single} = 1.18), $t(1\,9\,8)$ = 3.15, p < .01, d = 0.44, and were less willing to continue the advice relationship with the seeker ($M_{Multiple}$ = 5.48, $SD_{Multiple}$ = 1.79, M_{Single} = 6.12, SD_{Single} = 1.13), $t(1\,9\,8)$ = 3.07, p < .01, d = 0.43. In a regression predicting post-interaction closeness, including pre-interaction closeness as a covariate to evaluate the change in closeness, the effect of being one of multiple advisors was negative and significant ($\beta_{Multiple}$ = −0.72, p < .01). Those who were one of multiple advisors also rated the seeker as significantly less competent ($M_{Multiple}$ = 5.12, $SD_{Multiple}$ = 1.48, M_{Single} = 5.73, SD_{Single} = 0.95), $t(1\,9\,8)$ = 3.51, p < .01, d = 0.49.

We evaluated the robustness of these findings by predicting advisor reactions to being one of multiple people consulted, controlling for the advice exchange characteristics we captured (outcome, power, status, domain, age, and gender). Even when controlling for characteristics of both the scenario and of the advisor and seeker, participants who were one of multiple advisors interpersonally distanced themselves significantly more than advisors who believed they were the only person consulted. Our regression results are summarized in Table 2.

14.3. Discussion

Study 4B indicates that, across a variety of real-world advice-giving situations, advisors who learned a seeker asked others for advice interpersonally distanced themselves from the seeker (H5a). Furthermore, despite popularized evidence that consulting multiple advisors is a superior advice-seeking strategy (Surowiecki, 2004), advisors judged seekers who asked others for advice as less competent. Participants who were one of multiple advisors even judged seekers as less competent when the seeker seemingly put the advice he or she collected to good use - by making a decision that worked out well for the seeker.

Given the significant interpersonal consequences of ignoring advice or seeking advice from multiple advisors, in Study 5, we shift to focus on why advice seekers may fail to anticipate these harmful relational effects.

15. Study 5: Asymmetry in advisor and seeker expectations

In Study 5, we assess whether advisors and seekers approach advice interactions with asymmetric views about the purpose of the interaction. We predicted that seekers would be relatively focused on information gathering, whereas advisors would be relatively focused on providing guidance. Such asymmetry would likely drive a wedge between each person's expectations that the advisor's advice would be taken. Whereas information gathering would serve to expand the seeker's option set, making it less likely that any given alternative would be pursued, guidance provision would narrow it, increasing the likelihood that a seeker would follow a specific course of action. Accordingly, if advisors (relative to seekers) view the interaction as providing guidance rather than information, advisors would likely have a greater expectation that the advice would be followed, and react negatively to indications that it may not be (such as when a seeker consults multiple advisors).

15.1. Method

Participants. To facilitate an advice-seeking and giving interaction, we recruited participants who were either proficient in coding in Java (advisors) (N = 102; 75% male, M_{age} = 31.0, SD = 8.2), or were interested in learning to code in Java (seekers) (N = 100; 63% male, M_{age} = 33.5, SD = 9.5) from Amazon Mechanical Turk to participate in this study for $0.60.

Design. Participants were told that after answering a few questions, they would be connected "to chat with someone who is proficient in [interested in learning] Java" in order to give or receive advice about learning Java. Next, participants were asked their views about the purpose of the interaction using four items rated on a continuous scale, "Approaching this interaction, to what extent do you think its purpose is to…" (give [receive] information (0)…give [receive] guidance (1 0 0), provide [obtain] knowledge (0)…provide [obtain] a recommendation (1 0 0), discovery (0)…direction (1 0 0), explore the possible options (0)…evaluate the possible options (1 0 0). We combined these four items into a composite measure of information focus (0) versus guidance focus (1 0 0) (α = 0.62).

Participants were then connected to chat via ChatPlat, a web application that enables participants to chat via text in real time. Participants next indicated their age and gender, and exited the study.

Table 2

Advisors interpersonally distance themselves from seekers who seek advice from multiple advisors (controlling for a variety of situational and personal characteristics).

Independent Variables		Dependent Variable					
		Advisor Offense		Post Interaction Closeness		Willingness to Continue Advice Relationship	
Condition							
	Multiple Advisors	0.589	**	−0.598	**	−0.438	*
Characteristics of Situation							
	Good Outcome	−1.401	**	0.736	**	1.798	**
	Structural Power of Counterpart	−0.401		0.255		−0.083	
	Comparative Status of Counterpart	0.019		−0.094		0.393	
	Personal Domain (vs. Professional)	−0.444	*	0.398	*	0.593	**
Characteristics of Advisor & Seeker							
	Pre-Interaction Closeness	−0.062		0.713	**	0.181	**
	Relative Age	0.082		0.049		−0.068	
	Seeker Female	−0.025		−0.130		−0.022	
	Participant Female	0.090		−0.184		−0.038	
	Same Gender	0.183		−0.012		−0.576	**
Constant		3.324	**	1.229	**	3.673	**
R^2		0.282		0.655		0.379	
Adjusted R^2		0.244		0.637		0.346	
n		200		200		200	

[†] p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01.

15.2. Results

Whereas seekers indicated they viewed the purpose of the advice interaction as more information focused ($M_{guidance}$ = 39.29, $SD_{guidance}$ = 19.20), advisors viewed the interaction as more guidance focused ($M_{guidance}$ = 52.58, $SD_{guidance}$ = 17.89), $t(2\,0\,0)$ = 5.09, $p < .01$, $d = 0.72$.

15.3. Discussion

Study 5 highlights an asymmetry between advisors' and seekers' points of view entering into an advice interaction: compared with advisors, seekers view the purpose of an advice interaction as more discovery-oriented and informational, and less guidance-oriented and directive (H6). This disconnect is likely to lead advisors to overestimate the likelihood that their advice will be taken, potentially exposing seekers to unanticipated negative interpersonal consequences if they don't take the advisor's advice.

16. General discussion

This research sheds light on an important yet overlooked consequence of advice-seeker decisions: advisor reactions to them. While prior work has evaluated seekers' choices based on the content of the final judgment or decision they make (Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006), our research demonstrates that the decision to take or ignore advice – or merely alter perceptions that one will take or ignore advice - profoundly impacts advisors' perceptions, reactions, and the seeker-advisor relationship.

Across nine studies, we found that advisors denigrate and interpersonally distance themselves from advice seekers who seek and then disregard their advice (Studies 1A-C, 2), a tendency which is exacerbated when the advisor holds domain expertise (Study 3). Furthermore, advisors interpersonally punish seekers who they merely perceive are less likely to follow their advice, such as seekers who consult multiple advisors to leverage the wisdom of crowds (Studies 4A-B). Our findings suggest that advice seekers should weigh their decision accuracy goals against the potential for interpersonal backlash when making their advice-seeking choices.

Furthermore, we document an asymmetry between the seeker and advisor perspectives: they disagree about the purpose of the interaction. In contrast to advisors, who believe the purpose of giving advice is more about helping narrow seekers' options by providing direction, seekers believe the purpose of asking for advice is more about gathering information to expand their set of considered alternatives (Study 5). Whereas narrowing the option set would increase the likelihood that the advice would be followed, broadening it would decrease this likelihood. Accordingly, this asymmetry provides useful insight into seekers' advice-seeking decisions, and advisor's perceptions of those decisions. Advisors are likely to overestimate the likelihood that their advice will be followed, whereas seekers are likely unaware of the extent to which their relationship with their selected advisor may suffer if they decide not to follow the advice they receive or choose to seek advice from multiple advisors.

17. Theoretical contributions

Our findings make several important theoretical contributions. First, this work fundamentally advances advice research by investigating advice as a process with interpersonal motives and consequences, rather than solely focusing on the accuracy of the final decision (Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006; Feng & MacGeorge, 2006; Yaniv & Kleinberger, 2000; Yaniv, 2004). As people commonly seek advice from high-status others (Feng & MacGeorge, 2006; Nadler et al., 2003), with whom they have important relationships (Bryant & Conger, 1999), negative advisor

reactions may ultimately impact seekers' futures just as much (if not more) than the accuracy of any single decision. Emerging work suggests that ignoring advice may have significant downstream consequences on the quality of future advice one receives (Belkin & Kong, 2018). Yet beyond the provision of additional advice or information, advisors are often in a position to support seekers in other valuable ways. For example, advisors may be able to make introductions or serve as a reference for seekers, which could improve seekers' outcomes more than if they aggregated even the best advice. Seekers who jeopardize their relationships with advisors by asking others for advice or choosing not to follow the advice they receive may diminish (or forego) these advantages.

Conceptualizing advice as an interpersonal exchange is also significant because interpersonal consequences may be the most predictable or observable outcome from an advice exchange. Despite the large body of research devoted to uncovering what advice-seeking strategies promote decision accuracy (Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006), it is rare that a seeker's decision is objectively "right" or "wrong." In contrast to the ambiguity surrounding decision-making quality, our research suggests that the interpersonal outcomes of their choices are clearer. When seekers make the choice to consult multiple advisors or disregard an advisor's advice, they suffer negative interpersonal consequences. Advisors feel less close with such seekers, are less willing to give them advice in the future, and are more likely to end their relationships with them. Even in situations with a clear "right" and "wrong" decision, seekers must take interpersonal considerations into account.

Third, our findings contribute to an underexplored psychology of advising. Whereas advice research has traditionally taken the advice recipient's perspective (Bonaccio & Dalal, 2006), we highlight that advisors are more than objective repositories of information; they too have motives, opinions, expectations, and egos, and each of these plays an important role in the outcome of an advice exchange. Advisor reactions can have significant consequences for seekers, especially given that advisors are often more powerful and higher status than those they advise (Agneessens & Wittek, 2012; Feng & MacGeorge, 2006; Nadler et al., 2003).

Our findings also unearth a meaningful asymmetry between the advisor's and seeker's expectations and beliefs about the advice process. Whereas advisors tend to believe they are giving advice to help narrow the option set with direction, seekers believe they are seeking advice to gather information. These disjointed views are likely to be consequential. For example, such views may guide the types of questions seekers ask, and the type of information that advisors provide. This finding speaks to the emerging literature about the importance that communicators establish a shared reality—to experience commonality with others' inner states and expectations about the world (e.g., Echterhoff, Higgins, & Levine, 2017). It seems advice seekers and advisors fail to establish a shared reality over the course of their advice interactions.

Finally, this research challenges prior recommendations about advice-seeking strategies. Scholars have recommended that advice seekers consult multiple advisors in order to leverage the wisdom of crowds (Mannes, 2009; Soll & Larrick, 2009; Surowiecki, 2004). We have found that such a strategy may expose seekers to interpersonal backlash. Separately, advice seekers have been instructed to pursue advisors with expertise in the domain of interest (Brooks et al., 2015; Garvin & Margolis, 2015). However, expert advisors are more likely to punish seekers who ignore their advice. Thus, advice seekers would be wise to weigh their decision accuracy goals with their interpersonal ones.

18. Limitations and future directions

Our studies have several limitations that highlight fruitful areas for future research. First, our studies focus on interpersonal reactions

following a single advice interaction. However, people often seek and give advice to the same counterpart again and again over time, such as in mentoring relationships (Hunt & Michael, 1983; Kram, 1988), and thus may heed some advice and ignore other advice they receive from the same advisor. In fact, we suspect that seeking advice from the same trusted advisor may permit advice seekers to ignore advice with a lower degree of backlash. Future work should explore interpersonal reactions in such repeated advice relationships—with relationships viewed as a portfolio of interactions over time. Although Studies 1A and 4B, which considered real world advice exchanges, provide limited evidence that interpersonal distancing does occur even within ongoing relationships, further inquiry should explore the nature of the effect in relationships in which advice is frequently exchanged.

On the other hand, a seeker may choose to forego seeking advice from a particular advisor entirely. Although prior work would suggest that electing not to consult an advisor may deprive seekers from potentially positive interpersonal benefits (Brooks et al., 2015), we do not directly compare advisors' reactions to seekers who ignore advice to advisor reactions to seekers who do not consult them at all. Future work considering this question could provide additional useful insight into the consequences of advice seekers' decisions.

Separately, we have provided evidence that advisors react negatively when their advice is perceived as less likely to be followed, such as when a seeker consults multiple advisors (Studies 4A and 4B). Yet, this gap – between reactions to seekers who consult one versus multiple advisors – could additionally be driven by advisors rewarding people who seek advice from only them. We expect that both mechanisms could be at play, paralleling our findings from Study 1B, which indicated that advisors both penalized advisees who forewent their advice, and rewarded advisees who followed their advice.

There is also a variety of aspects of advice-giving interactions that may moderate our effects. For example, the order in which one is approached for advice (i.e. whether one is the first or last advisor sought), or the point at which a seeker decides to seek additional advisors (before, during, or after receiving one's advice), could influence advisors' reactions to being one of several people consulted. In addition, the degree of success a seeker achieves after electing not to follow one's advice, or the effort an advisor makes in providing the advice are both likely to influence the advisor's reactions. Although we find that the effect of ignoring advice persists when we control for many of these factors (Studies 1A and 4B), future work could shed additional light on whether and when these effects are likely to be stronger or weaker.

In addition, the ways in which advice seekers communicate their decisions are likely to influence advisors' reactions to them. In Studies 1B and 2, it was unclear how the seeker's decision was revealed to the advisor, and in Studies 1C, 3, and 4A, the revelation was made by the experimenter. Future work could consider how the means by which a seeker's choice is revealed, and the actions seekers take after disregarding an advisor's advice (e.g. apologizing) might affect advisor reactions.

Similarly, we did not consider situations in which advisors may be especially interested in having their advice followed, such as when the advisor stands to personally benefit from the seeker's decision (i.e. a conflict of interest). Although we anticipate that advisor conflicts of interest may increase the advisor's tendency to distance him or herself from the seeker after he or she ignores the advisor's advice, conflicts of interest may narrow the advisor-seeker misperception gap. For example, Sah et al. (2013) found that when an advisor's interests are made known to the seeker, seekers feel increased social pressure to comply with the advice they receive. Explicit knowledge about conflicts of interest may make the interpersonal consequences of the advice exchange more salient for the seeker. Future research could consider the extent to which such cues cause seekers to change the weight they give to decision accuracy versus relational motives when they are deciding to seek and/or rely on advice.

18.1. Practical implications

We find that the advice-seeking decisions people make have important interpersonal consequences. Our findings underscore a whole class of outcome variables that seekers should include in their calculus to decide when and from whom to seek advice: the risk of negative interpersonal backlash. Seekers aware of these interpersonal costs of their advice-seeking decisions may consider approaching advisors who may be more receptive to being one of several advisors or whose recommendations they would be likely to take. Awareness and consideration of the interpersonal risks could help seekers make more optimal advice-seeking decisions that take into account the full suite of benefits and costs of their choices.

Advisors may also benefit by gaining awareness about the general tendency to react to seekers' decisions with an egocentric bias. Many advisors genuinely want to help the seekers they advise (Guntzviller & MacGeorge, 2012). Accordingly, negative advisor reactions to a seeker's decisions may not align with the advisors' own goals.

We additionally highlight a perception gap between advisors and seekers. Compared with seekers, advisors enter an advice interaction intending to provide relatively more direction and relatively less exploration. Knowledge of this gap could help advice seekers and advisors alike by encouraging them to discuss (and agree on) the purpose of the interaction before proceeding. Increasing awareness and question-asking about the problem ("Are we here to narrow or expand the option set?") could help seekers and advisors establish a more precise shared reality during their conversations (Echterhoff et al., 2017; Huang et al., 2017).

In sum, we conclude that advisors and seekers alike should consider goals in addition to decision accuracy when engaging in advice interactions. Our findings offer a resounding warning for seekers to beware: ignoring solicited advice can be quite costly.

Appendix A. Advice-seeking behavior survey of full-time employees

We recruited 150 participants who worked full time from academic panel provider Prolific Academic. We asked whether they had sought advice to make a decision in the past month. Those answering "yes" (N = 119, 79.3%, 46% male, M_{age} = 34.66, SD = 9.36) completed this study in exchange for $0.50. Participants were next asked a series of questions about their advice-seeking behaviors: whether the advice domain was personal (28.6%), work-related (27.7%) or both (43.7%); whether they sought advice from an expert (12.6%), non-expert (60.5%) or both (26.9%); whether they disregarded or ignored any of the advice they received (52.9% had); and whether they had sought advice from multiple advisors (58.8% had). Participants completed the study by indicating their age and gender.

Appendix B. Advice literature review

We conducted a review of prior research on advice to understand what, if anything, is known about the connection between advice seeking and interpersonal outcomes. We began by reviewing the empirical citations from the most highly-cited recent advice research review article, "Advice

taking and decision-making: An integrative literature review, and implications for the organizational sciences" by Bonaccio and Dalal (2006). Next, we conducted a search for articles published in management and psychology journals using the keyword the "advice." As Bonaccio and Dalal (2006) identify 1986 as the publication date of the first paper on advice, we searched for articles subsequent to that date. Our search yielded 100 papers published on advice comprising 266 studies.

For each paper, we documented whether the studies in the paper allowed for future interaction between the advisor and advice seeker. We additionally documented whether the studies in the paper empirically considered interpersonal assessments of the advisor or seeker.

Our review indicated that almost all prior work has focused on cross-sectional or one-time interactions that ended after the advice was given. That is, the majority of past advice research has not considered the potential for future interaction between the advisor and seeker after the focal advice interaction has ended.

Of the 100 advice-focused papers our search yielded, only 22 papers (22%) considered situations in which advisors could have interacted with an advice seeker after providing advice. In the majority of these papers (82%), the potential future interaction between the advisor and seeker was not evaluated, but was rather a consequence of the authors' use of survey-based methodology in which participants reported about their advice-seeking or giving interactions with others with whom they could subsequently interact (e.g. Constant, Sproull, & Kiesler, 1996; McDonald & Westphal, 2003; See et al., 2011), or recruitment of participants previously known to one another (i.e. classmates) (e.g. Eggleston, Wilson, Lee, & Gilbert, 2015; Sniezek & Van Swol, 2001).

Four of the papers our search identified provide some insight into the advisor-seeker relationship after advice is exchanged. First, Goldsmith and Fitch's (1997) ethnographic study of advice episodes reveals some of the tradeoffs advisors and seekers make when engaging in advice interactions—advisors may be viewed as helpful or "butting in" and supportive or honest, and seekers may be viewed as grateful or independent. Second, in a qualitative study of peer-advisors to patients recovering from myocardial infarctions, Whittemore, Rankin, Callahan, Leder, and Carroll (2000) found that advisors can provide valuable socio-emotional support. Third, Belkin and Kong (2018) found that advisors are more likely to provide conflicted second opinions to advice seekers who previously failed to incorporate their advice. Lastly, Schwartz et al. (2011) found that patients who have longer past relationships with a specific healthcare provider are less likely to pursue a second opinion—this work provides suggestive evidence of an important connection between relationship closeness and the number of advisors one pursues, which we investigate in more depth.

In addition to prior work largely overlooking the potential for future interaction between advisors and seekers, a small minority of articles have measured the interpersonal consequences of advice interactions. Of the 100 advice-focused papers we identified, only 19 (19%) had empirically considered interpersonal assessments of the advisor. For 12 of these 19 papers (63%), the interpersonal measures focused on the seeker's assessments of advisor competence or trustworthiness (e.g., Price & Stone, 2004; Sah, Moore, & MacCoun, 2013). Only two of the 100 papers (2%) investigated interpersonal assessments of the advice seeker. In addition to the aforementioned ethnographic work by Goldsmith and Fitch (1997), Brooks et al. (2015) found that when the advisor does not know the seeker's final judgment or decision, seeking advice increases the advisor's perceptions of the advice seeker's competence. A summary of our review is below.

Journal	Papers	Studies	Papers in Which At Least One Study Includes Possibility of Future Interaction	% of Total	Papers for Which Possibility of Future Interaction is Not Merely Incidental*	% of Total	Papers that Empirically Consider Interpersonal Assessments of Advisor	% of Total	Papers that Empirically Consider Interpersonal Assessments of Seeker	% of Total
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes	29	90	4	14%	0	0%	6	21%	0	0%
Journal of Behavioral Decision Making	13	36	0	0%	0	0%	2	15%	0	0%
Journal of Applied Psychology	7	9	3	43%	0	0%	2	29%	0	0%
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology	6	20	1	17%	1	17%	2	33%	0	0%
Management Science	5	11	0	0%	0	0%	1	20%	1	20%
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology	4	23	0	0%	0	0%	1	25%	0	0%
International Journal of Forecasting	4	10	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%	0	0%
Others (two or fewer articles each)	32	67	14	44%	3	9%	5	16%	1	3%
Total	100	266	22	22%	4	4%	19	19%	2	2%

*Studies for which future interaction is an element of the study design, and not the consequence of a survey-based methodology, or co-participation in a study with known others.

Appendix C. Recall task directions

(adapted from Schaerer et al., 2018).

Study 1A: Advice followed versus not followed

Please recall a particular incident in which <u>someone else asked you for advice and ultimately followed (did not follow) your advice</u>. By advice, we mean a situation in which someone asked you for your opinion, recommendation, or guidance.

Please describe this situation in which someone else asked you for advice and ultimately followed (did not follow) your advice. What happened, what kind of advice was sought from you, how you felt, etc. It is important that in the situation you describe how you felt when your advice was (not) put into action by the other person and what your relationship to the other person was.

Please provide as many details as possible about the situation so that a person reading your essay can understand what happened and how you felt.

Study 4B: Advice sought from multiple advisors versus single advisor

Please recall and write about a particular incident in which someone else asked you [and only you for advice about a given issue] for advice about a given issue and asked other people for their advice about the same issue. By advice, we mean a situation in which someone asked you for your opinion, recommendation or guidance.

Please describe this situation in which someone else asked you [and only you for advice about a given issue] for advice about a given issue and asked other people for their advice about the same issue. What happened, what kind of advice was sought from you, how you felt, etc. It is important that in the situation you describe what your relationship to the other person was and how you felt when you found out the person sought advice from [you and only you] other people in addition to yourself.

Appendix D. Survey scales

Offense (Harinck et al., 2013) (*strongly disagree (1) – strongly agree (7)*)

I was insulted.
I was hurt.
I felt [the seeker] did not show respect.
I felt [the seeker's] behavior was unacceptable.
I was humiliated.
I was embarrassed.
I had my honor hurt.

Willingness to Continue the Advice Relationship (*strongly disagree (1) – strongly agree (7)*)

I would give [the seeker] advice in the future.
I would not be interested in giving advice to [the seeker] anymore.
I am willing to give more advice to [the seeker].

Seeker Competence (Cuddy et al., 2008) (*strongly disagree (1) – strongly agree (7)*)

[The seeker] is competent.
[The seeker] is confident.
[The seeker] is able.
[The seeker] is skillful.

Seeker Warmth (Cuddy et al., 2008) (*strongly disagree (1) – strongly agree (7)*)

[The seeker] is warm.
[The seeker] is nice.
[The seeker] is friendly.
[The seeker] is sincere.

Seeker Carelessness (Mishra & Mishra, 2010) (*strongly disagree (1) – strongly agree (7)*)

[The seeker] is careless.
[The seeker] is impulsive.
[The seeker] is responsible. (R)
[The seeker] is methodical. (R)
[The seeker] is a planner. (R)
[The seeker] is self-controlled. (R)
[The seeker] is restrained. (R)
[The seeker] is farsighted.
[The seeker] is impulsive.
[The seeker] is extravagant.
[The seeker] is enjoys spending.
[The seeker] is rational. (R)

Self-Perceived Ineptitude (Hysom, 2009) (*strongly disagree (1) – strongly agree (7)*)

I am…capable (1) - incapable (7)
I am…unknowledgeable (1) - knowledgeable (7)
I am…ineffective (1) - effective (7)

Self-Perceived Social Worth (Heatherton & Polivy, 1991) (*strongly disagree (1) – strongly agree (7)*)

I am worried about what other people think of me.

I feel concerned about the impression I am making.
I feel inferior to others at this moment.
I feel displeased with myself.
I feel self-conscious.
I feel that others respect and admire me. (R)
I am worried about looking foolish.
I am worried about whether I am regarded as a success or failure.

Seeker Competence (Alternate) (Brooks et al., 2015) (*strongly disagree (1) – strongly agree (7)*)

[The seeker] is very capable of solving problems.
I feel very confident about [the seeker]'s skills.
[The seeker] is well qualified.

Perceptions Advice Will be Followed (*strongly disagree (1) – strongly agree (7)*)

I believe [the seeker] will take my advice.
I feel confident that [the seeker] will follow my suggestions.
I think that [the seeker] will ignore my advice.

Appendix E. Supplementary material

Supplementary data to this article can be found online at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.obhdp.2018.12.002.

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